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The $7 Trillion Question:
Mutual Funds & Investor Welfare
OVERVIEW AND UPDATE
RICHARD BOOTH: Welcome to the University of Maryland's third annual business
law conference. This year we are focusing on the imbroglio in the mutual fund
industry. We have a stellar crew of panelists, and it is going to be a very informative
and interactive day. The fundamental idea behind this conference is to get practic-
ing lawyers and people from the industry and academics together to share ideas in
a format that I think is all too rare.
I would especially like to thank T. Rowe Price and Henry Hopkins, its general
counsel. Henry Hopkins is an esteemed alumnus and great friend of the law school.
T. Rowe Price has been very generous with its financial support.
My colleague, Professor Lisa Fairfax, will introduce and moderate the first panel.
LISA FAIRFAX: Thank you. This first panel will focus on how the current
problems arose in the mutual fund industry and, to some extent, how to fix them. I
am going to briefly introduce the panelists. Let me start with Jay Baris, a partner
with Kramer Levin Naftalis & Frankel. He has practiced extensively in this area,
which encompasses the regulation of investment companies, investment advisers,
and broker dealers. Next to him is Professor Tamar Frankel, a professor at the
Boston University School of Law. She has published extensively in the areas of fi-
nancial systems, regulation, fiduciary law, and corporate governance. Next to Pro-
fessor Frankel is Richard Phillips, a senior partner and head of securities at
Kirkpatrick & Lockhart, where he concentrates in securities regulation, particularly
investment management, broker dealers, and SEC enforcement. He has also held
various positions at the SEC, including as staff director of the SEC corporate disclo-
sure and investment company studies.
At the other table, we have Margaret Bancroft, a senior member of the financial
services group at Dechert Price in New York. She is also an adjunct professor at the
New York University School of Law. Next to Margaret is Tom Smith. He is a partner
at the New York office of Sidley Austin, where his practice focuses on pooled invest-
ment entities, such as investment companies and real estate investment trusts. Mr.
Smith is a co-chair of the task force of the ABA Subcommittee on Investment Com-
panies and Advisors, where he is preparing the third edition of the Fund Director's
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Guidebook.' Next to him is Frank Razzano, a partner at Dickstein Shapiro Morin &
Oshinsky. In addition, he is an adjunct professor here at Maryland. He specializes
in white-collar criminal defense and SEC enforcement. He has also served as an
assistant U.S. attorney in the District of New Jersey as well as a special assistant U.S.
attorney in the District of Maryland.
We are going to have two presentations, the first by Professor Frankel and the
second by Professor Razzano. They will lay the groundwork and provide context
for the current mutual fund controversy. Then we will have a broader discussion
among the panelists, both commenting on the presentations and trying to respond
to the general question of how we got here.
TAMAR FRANKEL: Thank you very much. How we got into this mess is, of course,
difficult to explain, and why we got into it is even harder to analyze. I would like to
suggest six movements that have happened throughout the last twenty years that
may have brought about what we see now. The first is that the adviser moved from
being a profession to operating a business. What is the difference? The first goal of
a profession is public service and the second goal is making a living. The main and
only goal of businesspersons is profit; the public has to take care of itself. Section
36(b) of the 1940 Act2 demonstrates the professional aspect of investment advisers.
When you look at the decision of Gartenberg," however, you will see the second
aspect; it is a business.
Here is an example. Market timing is not new, but so long as the advisers cared
about the performance of their funds, they controlled excessive sales or redemp-
tions and purchases. But then advisers had an opportunity to receive payment to
benefit some investors at the expense of others. What they did then is a cost-benefit
analysis, which meant that even though they would lose on the lower performance
of their funds, they would gain much more from the payment of allowing market
timing. Now it is very good business to accept the payment. Why not? It is a terrible
decision as a professional.
The second movement that got us into this mess is that advisers moved from
emphasizing advisory services to focusing on sales. Advisers were viewed as trustees
and got the fees of trustees that were connected to the assets. In the case of a trust,
performance is what also rewards the trustee. In the case of a mutual fund, how-
ever, you can do much better by emphasizing sales, because even rising perform-
ance can never compare to good sales. The brokers have clout through revenue
sharing or the other arrangements that we are seeing now, at the expense of the
shareholders. What I think we have done is not only to allow, but also to encourage
competition among advisers. What were advisers competing over? They competed
I. FEDERAL REGULATION OF SECURITIES COMMITTEE, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, FUND DIRECTORS
GUIDEBOOK (3d ed. 2006).
2. Investment Company Act § 36, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35 (2000).
3. Gartenberg v. Merril Lynch Asset Mgmt. Inc., 740 F.2d 190 (2d Cir. 1984).
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over who was going to pay the brokers more. On this issue I agree with my friend
Dick Phillips.
RICHARD PHILLIPS: I haven't said anything yet. [laughter]
TAMAR FRANKEL: No, but you have written on the subject. You have suggested
that there should be a rule prohibiting this kind of competition.
The third movement that brought us to this mess is the relaxation of legal
prohibitions, without accompanying controls. Again, market timing is a good ex-
ample. There were good reasons for relaxing the 4:00 p.m. rule. There is no doubt
about it. But without guarantees and responsibilities, we got the Canary [Capital
Partners] hedge fund corruption.4 We also got the following of Canary hedge fund,
and the result was that enforcement was not taken care of. The practice of market
timing then undermined the culture of honesty in the industry.
The fourth movement that brought us this mess is that we have ignored the law
on the books. It is clear that the greater the size of funds and the amounts under
management, the higher the advisers' fees and other benefits. Size, however, is not
always for the benefit of the shareholders. In rule 12b-1, under the Investment
Company Act of 1940,' there is a balance, there is some line, there is some gui-
dance. The shareholders must benefit from the size as well. After all, they are the
ones who pay the brokers. The balance, line, and guidance were ignored. This atti-
tude breeds disdain for the law on the books. It breeds contempt not only for the
particular rule, but also for every rule. That undermines the culture of following
the law.
A fifth movement that brought us this mess is the movement from standards to
specific rules. Advisers said to the regulators, "Tell us precisely what you want us to
do or not do, and we will do it or not do it." The result is that everything else is
permissible. The reason for that change was theoretical. Precision was arguably
more efficient. Why shouldn't the fiduciary have an opportunity to engage in activ-
ities that do not hurt the clients and create more value? The answer is that this
efficiency creates tremendous inefficiency in enforcement. We used to have some
foggy gray area around the prohibition. And that meant more risk for the fiduciary.
It also meant more effective enforcement. We have lost that effective enforcement,
and now we are paying the price.
And, finally, we weakened fiduciary law by interpretation. I remember a time
when we looked at the rule, and we said, "What is the purpose of this rule? What
was the wrong that the rule was supposed to prevent?" We then looked at another
situation and said, "OK, this is a new situation. Let's look at the particular problem
and see whether the new situation raises the same problem." What do we do now?
We go to the dictionary, and we say, "What is the meaning of this word?" We do so
out of context. We have forgotten what the rule is about. We have forgotten what
4. In re Mut. Funds Inv. Litig., 384 F. Supp. 2d 845 (D. Md. 2005).
5. 17 C.F.R. § 270.12b-I (2005).
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its purpose was. Now we ask, "How did we get into this mess?" My answer is that it
is no wonder we got into this mess.
LISA FAIRFAX: Thank you. Now we are going to hear from Frank Razzano.
FRANK RAZZANO: How did we get into this? I think the answer to that question is
Eliot Spitzer and the Martin Act.6 Eliot Spitzer ran for attorney general in New York
in 1994, and he came in dead last in the Democratic primary. In 1998, he was back
on the scene, and this time defeated the incumbent, Dennis Vocco, as attorney
general in New York State. And when he assumed office, he assembled a team of
lawyers from very prestigious firms in New York City. He seduced them out of
private practice to work for the attorney general's office. The first big case that
Spitzer brought was with the research analysis investigation.
In June 2001, the Wall Street Journal ran an article about a pediatrician settling
with a broker-dealer for $400,000, based on allegations of biased research.7 As a
result of reading that article, he began an investigation-sort of what Stanley
Sporkin used to do as Director of the SEC Division of Enforcement back in the
1970s: start investigations based on what he read in the paper. The investigation
uncovered some interesting e-mails, and the broker-dealer wanted to settle. But it
wanted to keep the e-mail traffic confidential, obviously to keep it away from class
action plaintiffs. On April 5, 2002, Spitzer basically told the broker-dealer the game
was up and it had to come to the table and make a deal. The broker-dealer then
went to Rudy Giuliani and hired him to approach Spitzer. The same day that Giu-
liani called Spitzer, April 8, 2002, Spitzer went into court and got an injunction
under the Martin Act. The injunction, as we will see, is not an injunction that any
other attorney general could have gotten in any other state or even the federal
government, because it was an injunction that enjoined the broker-dealer's busi-
ness practices without the need for proof of success on the merits while Spitzer
continued his investigation. A month later he got a $100 million settlement.
Then, we had the hot issue of the IPO [initial public offering] spinning inquiry.
Spitzer attacked the practice of spinning using the Martin Act's disgorgement pro-
visions. Until Spitzer attacked spinning, it was unclear whether IPO spinning was
even fraudulent. Indeed, many people in the business said, "Hey, this is a good
business-development tool, and that is the way you get business." The NASD [Na-
tional Association of Securities Dealers, Inc.] and the SEC knew about this, clearly.
In fact, there was a Wall Street Journal article about spinning in the industry! In
1997, the NASD even issued a warning to its members about it.9 Spitzer was able to
6. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 352 (McKinney 1996 & Supp. 2006) (referred to as the Martin-Webb Act in the
Historical and Statutory Notes).
7. Charles Gasparino, Outlook For Analysts: Skepticism and Blame, WALL ST. J., June 13 2001, at C1.
8. Charles Gasparino, The SEC and Spitzer Might Outlaw "Spinning" ofIPOs, WALL ST. I., Nov. 5, 2002, at
C1.
9. See National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., Notice to Members 97-82, November 1997, http://
www.nasd.com/web/groups/rules-regs/documents/notice-to-members/nasdw 004392.pdf.
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attack the IPO spinning investigation, again, because the Martin Act made it easier
for him to do that. And look at the results he got. Just look at the amounts of
money he collected with the global settlement.
Then, in September 2003, the mutual fund scandal hit, a scandal that blindsided
both the SEC and the NASD. And as soon as the investigation was announced,
Spitzer got some terrific settlements. These were settlements he got within the first
month of the investigation. Spitzer has been called Wall Street's "top cop," the "en-
forcer," the "sheriff of Wall Street," and it is rumored that he is going to run for
governor in 2006.
Clearly he has been an activist attorney general. But he was able to do this only
because of the Martin Act, which is different from any other piece of legislation. It
was passed in 1921, and unlike "blue sky" laws or even the federal Securities Act of
1933,10 it is not a regulatory statute. It is a law-enforcement statute that gives the
New York attorney general very broad powers with respect to almost all areas of the
securities business. It empowers the attorney general to bring actions without hav-
ing to show intentional wrongdoing or negligent conduct. Indeed, you do not have
to show that anyone intended to be defrauded or that anyone actually was de-
frauded. And like the RICO statute," the Martin Act is supposed to be liberally and
sympathetically construed.
The statute also has a criminal component. It is a misdemeanor violation in New
York to violate the Martin Act. Again, no proof of intent is required, no proof that
actual fraud took place is required, and no proof that anyone was defrauded is
required. 2 In 1986, the Martin Act was amended to incorporate a felony provision,
which does require proof of intent. 3
I just want to go briefly through why the Martin Act is so powerful. The first two
provisions of the Martin Act look pretty much like the mail and wire fraud statute,
17(a)," and 10b-5;'5 but look at this one, number three: making or attempting to
make a "fictitious or pretended purchase or sale" of securities or commodities. 6
Many of you may remember the Mulhern7 case where the Second Circuit expressed
doubt about whether merely trading without investment intent could constitute
securities fraud under the '34 Act.' Here, however, there is no requirement of in-
tent or, as in section 9 of the '34 Act,' 9 that you induce someone to enter the
10. 15 U.S.C. § 77a-77aa (2000).
11. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (2000).
12. N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 352-c(4) (McKinney 1996).
13. Id. §§ 352-c(5)-(6).
14. 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a (2005).
15. Id. § 240.iob-5.
16. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 352-c(l)(a) (McKinney 1996).
17. Savoie v. Merchants Bank, 166 F.3d 456 (2d Cir. 1999).
18. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a-78nn (2000).
19. Id. § 78i.
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market. Additionally, there is no requirement, as in 10b-5 under Affiliated Ute,20 of
a breach of fiduciary duty with respect to an omission of fact. If you have a "ficti-
tious or a pretended purchase," it is covered, and Mulhern-type trading without
investment intent would be covered.
Look at this language: "employ[ing or seeming] ...to employ any deception,
misrepresentation, concealment, [or] suppression ....2 I suggest that what this
means is that a material fact is actionable without proof of a breach of fiduciary
duty. Forget about Chiarella22 if you omit something that is a "concealment" and a
"suppression" under this Act. And you do not have to show that there was a breach
of fiduciary duty or that anyone acted intentionally.
Look at the criminal provisions. Again, we have this provision about "conceal-
ment" and "suppression." But look at this one: "Any promise or representation as to
the future which is beyond reasonable expectations or unwarranted by existing cir-
cumstances."23 You can be convicted of a misdemeanor violation without intent,
without negligence, by saying something, which is beyond reasonable expectation;
a fairly broad statute.
Look at this one: "Any representation or statement which is false."24 But look at
later on: Where through a "reasonable effort"25 you could determine what the truth
was, but you did not make a reasonable effort to ascertain the truth. It sounds like a
due-diligence standard for anyone who deals in securities, without any requirement
of intent and without any requirement that fraud took place.
Then let me go into this provision, which is the one Spitzer was able to use most
effectively. Under the Martin Act, the attorney general can conduct a private inves-
tigation or he can go to court and ask a judge on the New York Supreme Court,
which is the original trial court in New York State, to issue an injunction while the
attorney conducts a public investigation. That is what Spitzer did to the broker-
dealer I mentioned at the outset of my remarks. He announced that he was con-
ducting an investigation, and he asked the court, while he was conducting the in-
vestigation, to enjoin the broker-dealer and require it to disclose its relationships
with issuers when it prepared research reports-very, very broad powers. The SEC
does not have comparable powers. It cannot run into court and get an injunction
while it is investigating, but Spitzer was able to do it.
So, I submit to you that how we got here is in large measure due to an activist
attorney general with a statute-the Martin Act. This gave him broad powers to
attack practices within the industry. These were powers that, to some extent, the
SEC and the NASD just did not have. Thank you.
20. Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
21. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 352(1) (McKinney 1996).
22. Chiarella v. U.S., 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
23. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 352-c(1)(b) (McKinney 1996).
24. Id. § 352-c(1)(c).
25. Id.
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LISA FAIRFAX: Thank you.
THOMAS SMITH: Can I just add one comment to Frank's wonderful presentation?
You know, when the tech bubble burst in 2000 and the securities firms laid off
hundreds and hundreds of employees, many started knocking on Spitzer's door
with a story to tell, and that has continued to this day with the insurance industry.
Many of these informants who come to him are very disgruntled ex-employees
and-
MARGARET BANCROFT: But it was also a very active attorney general.
RICHARD PHILLIPS: I do want to take exception to one statement that Frank
made in his excellent presentation: the suggestion that the SEC does not have the
power to deal with the issues raised by the fund scandal. I do not believe it has the
broad powers contained in the Martin Act, but it has plenty of power to deal with
each and every issue that is now front and center before the agency. Until the
appearance of Eliot Spitzer in the aftermath of Enron, the SEC either did not see it
or did not think it was important enough to act aggressively. It is unclear, however,
whether the SEC is moving in the right direction or just making a lot of enforce-
ment noise but with very little meaningful regulatory reform to deal with the actual
issues.
JAY BARIs: Let us not forget that notwithstanding Frank's excellent presentation,
these cases involved allegations of fraud. Blaming the SEC for these problems is like
blaming the cops for the murder. While I appreciate everything you said, we should
remember that there was some wrongdoing here. And related to what Professor
Frankel said, I do not believe that there was a complete breakdown of all moral and
ethical fiber in the investment advisory business.
MARGARET BANCROFT: I think, going back to the beginning, we had the snake in
the Garden of Eden, a statement that was made some years ago and is encapsulated
in the legislative history of the 1940 Act-that funds are sold and not bought. It is
crucial to fund complexes and their advisers so that they gather more and more
assets, or at least maintain those assets. This is the critical dynamic here. When you
get to the market timing, what Stern at Canary offered (an offer that was seized
upon) was this: In exchange for letting me time funds A and B, I will commit to
your complex "sticky" assets of, say, $20 million, $30 million. Now, those commit-
ments were made on the sales side of the advisers. They were understood on the
sales side, and they were appreciated there as a means of increasing assets under
management.
I saw something very interesting this morning about market timing that came
over my Blackberry. After the market-timing scandal here, both the FSA [Financial
Services Authority] in the U.K. as well as the European community said, "My God,
I wonder what kind of market timing occurred in our markets." Their report has
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just come out.26 The interesting thing about the report, from reading the summary
this morning, is that when fund complexes were approached in Europe with the
same proffer, the Canary proffer, they turned it down. Now, that tells me that the
European market was not as focused on the need to gather assets as we are in the
U.S. and, therefore, did not have the same motivation. I really think that is going to
be worth looking at to see how that plays out.
RICHARD PHILLIPS: Let me just put this issue in a little perspective. We are talk-
ing about a mutual fund scandal; a picture of an industry permeated with fraud
and corruption, one would think. But the facts are that, thus far (and there may be
more cases coming down the pike, but not many more) twenty-three or twenty-
four fund management firms have been charged with either market timing or late-
trading wrongdoing by the SEC or Spitzer or both. That is twenty-four firms out of
400; about six percent of the industry in terms of numbers of firms, and probably
fewer in terms of assets because the industry giants such as Vanguard, American
Funds, and Fidelity have not been involved. So we are talking about six percent of
an industry. Can we ignore it and all go home? No. It is not a pretty picture, but it
is not a picture of an industry permeated by fraud or corruption.
Why did it happen? The industry forgot it was a profession? God help us if the
industry thought it was only a profession and not a business. Would you really
entrust $7 trillion dollars of assets to "professionals" who did not know how to run
a business? Having organizations with hundreds and thousands of employees and
with far-flung global activities, you had better operate as a business or there will
not be much of an operation left, so I do not think that is the issue.
The issue is an industry that lost control of its shareholder-account relationships.
Why? Because in the 1990s, control of the shareholders, to an ever-increasing ex-
tent, rested in the hands of the intermediaries, the brokers and pension fund ad-
ministrators. They kept the individual account records of those who traded
through omnibus accounts maintained by the administrators, and the broker-
dealers who were paid for maintaining their customer records and traded for their
customers through omnibus accounts. The industry, knowing there was a market-
timing problem, organized police forces to control it, pressed for redemption fees
and fair-value pricing against resistance by an SEC staff that did not have the foggi-
est idea that there was a problem with market timing. But concern by the fund
industry was not enough to force the intermediaries, who have no motivation to
interfere with their clients' transactions, to install expensive technology to identify
market-timing transactions and to impose redemption fees. They are not going to
do it unless they are forced by regulation to do so.
26. See Hector Sants, Managing Director, Speech at the Financial Services' Authority Asset Management
Conference: FSA's outlook on asset management risks, priorities and challenges (Sept. 28, 2004), http://www.
fsa.gov.uk/Pages/Library/Communication/Speeches/2004/SP198.shtm (discussing the effect of the market-
timing scandal on the mutual fund industry).
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What is so discouraging about what we have been through is a picture of an SEC
with two published rule proposals that really deal with the problems of market
timing and late trading: the mandatory five-day, two-percent redemption fee and
the hard 4:00 p.m. close. But the SEC is backing away from the rules and backing
away from any requirement that would effectively enforce against intermediaries
the obligation to assist fund managers in their efforts to curb market timing. If the
SEC does back down, we will be back to where we started from twenty years from
now.
MARGARET BANCROFT: Dick, as to your point about the role of the distributor,
the other day the CEO of the Scudder fund group had this to say: "Distributors, not
product manufacturers, are currently king."27 This industry works in cycles. We
have a distributor-dominated industry right now, whereas fifteen years ago it was a
product-manufacturing industry. I think that is going to play into another one of
your points.
RICHARD PHILLIPS: But that's the world.
MARGARET BANCROFT: That's the world today.
RICHARD PHILLIPS: So stop complaining and let's regulate it.
MARGARET BANCROFT: That's right, but the point is that fifteen years ago or
more the manufacture of fund products, in fact, had people asking that they make
more funds to sell. And one of the things that I think has changed, and has led to
revenue sharing and the other things, is the turnabout. Now product manufactur-
ers must persuade the third-party intermediaries to sell their products. That is part
of your point and part of your point also about...
RICHARD PHILLIPS: You cannot persuade them; you have to require them. No
individual fund complex can require them; only the government can do it.
MARGARET BANCROFT: That explains a lot of the revenue sharing and that sort of
thing.
LISA FAIRFAX: Let me get Tom's reactions.
THOMAS SMITH: Increasingly over the past two decades you had the mutual fund
industry gravitating from the old-line fiduciary, respecting investment manage-
ment funds, such as Henry Hopkins's T. Rowe Price here in Baltimore, to the con-
solidated financial institutions and public companies that have been buying up
fund groups, with the result that revenues have become king. The original Jack
Bogels of the world were making more money than they ever dreamed of in the old
days, but when you have public companies involved, and revenue-sharing alliances
being formed, there was immediate pressure to get everything you could out of the
fund relationships. And I would suggest that some of these companies (not all, but
27. See DWS Secures Roots Beyond Deutsche Bank, Professional Wealth Management, March 2, 2004, http://
www.pwmnet.com/news/fullstory.php/aid/729 (observing that distributors have "gained the upper hand" over
asset managers). Scudder was the U.S. mutual fund brand of Deutsche Bank's asset-management division,
Deutsche Asset Management. On February 2, 2006, Scudder Investments was rebranded as DWS Scudder.
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I would suggest it is a bit more than six percent) started tampering with the golden
goose. They were looking for more and more ways to get money from the funds,
and this led to the things such as market timing and all sorts of other fees. And you
had new entrants into the business, a number of whom did not understand or
appreciate the fiduciary responsibilities and conflicts of interests involved, and you
had the rise of the corrupting "everybody does it" mentality.
You also had all sorts of enablers, such as the hedge funds with all the money
they brought to the game. You had some twenty or so hedge funds that were exclu-
sively devoted, with billions of dollars, to market timing. You had the participation
of financial intermediaries, you had the omnibus accounts, you had the participa-
tion of clearing brokers, and you had lenders. Some of these people were out
coaching the fund managers as to how to set up market-timing arrangements.
Finally, you had your usual outliers: the Strongs of the world (Strong had been
in the precinct house several times already), and Messrs. Pilgrim and Baxter, who
were old-timers in this business. It was almost a perfect storm.
You know, Dick, when you talk about it being largely over, the SEC and the
states are continuing to go after this. There was a settlement announced yesterday
with Fremont Investment Advisers.2"
RICHARD PHILLIPS: It was public that they were involved. That is not...
THOMAS SMITH: No, but it is interesting. It is $4 million in damages. I did not
see any allegation in the settlement that the funds themselves suffered damages.
There was a relatively small amount of market timing that had been committed and
a small amount of late trading. My guess is that any number of investment advisory
firms are in that same boat: They had limited instances of market timing, and it
was not the big corrupting event that you had at Canary.
RICHARD PHILLIPS: No, I do not think there are many more firms out there that
had been involved in making explicit deals with market timers. The SEC and
Spitzer's investigations have been fairly thorough. There are a few more. We have
one that has not been charged and probably will be, but these are harder cases.
They are not black-and-white cases. The fact of the matter is you are talking about
twenty-odd firms that have been involved in making these deals. Of these firms,
only one, or perhaps two, at the fund manager's level had anything to do with late
trading, other than being victims. Of those firms, there were only two of them,
Strong and Pilgrim-Baxter, where top fund executives market-timed, and there are
two others where portfolio managers were market-timing.
The essence of the problem was that twenty-odd firms made undisclosed deals to
give market timers space in contravention of their prospectus representations. That
is the magnitude of the so-called scandal, and it is inexcusable. It is fraud, and the
SEC is well justified going after it. The real issue that the SEC cannot face is how to
28. In re Fremont Inv. Advisors, Inc., Investment Advisor Act Release No. 2,317, Investment Company Act
Release No. 26,655, 84 S.E.C. Docket 231 (Nov. 4, 2004).
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prevent it in the future. Disclosure is not going to do it. Fund governance is not
going to do it. You need to get control of the intermediaries, and the SEC is backing
down.
LISA FAIRFAX: I think that whether you see it as just six percent or you see it as
the tip of the iceberg, we now have at least some regulatory reforms that appear to
be trying to solve the problem. So, let me get a sense from everyone else: How can
we solve some of these problems? If it is not through legal enforcement, certainly it
could be through focusing on independent directors.
JAY BARIs: To answer that question, you must step back and look at what the
environment was or how the environment got this way. And if you go back to when
the Investment Company Act was passed in 1940, you had a particular market and
a particular limitation on technology. In effect, the changes in the law were not able
to catch up or keep up with the changes in the market and the changes in technol-
ogy. In 1940, you had a total industry measured in the billions, and nobody back
then could have foreseen that you would have a $7 trillion asset base. Back then
nobody had heard of globalization. There were no computers. There was no ability
to monitor the prices of securities in Japan at 4:00 a.m. instantaneously. There were
not the same opportunities for arbitrage.
As these changes in technology and the changes in the market developed over
time, giving rise to the intermediaries and so forth, the laws were not able to catch
up. We now have an opportunity, as Dick said before, for the laws to catch up with
technology. Add to this the element of fraud. Everybody was home, the doors were
unlocked, and everybody felt secure. We did not expect anybody to just walk in the
front door and steal the apple on the table.
That was a long-winded way of answering your question. What do we do now?
Where do we go? How do we deal with this? What is going on in the boardroom?
How are directors reacting? The directors who are our clients are all good people
who want to do the right thing. To speak to Professor Frankel's point, they are
looking for guidance. How do we fulfill our fiduciary obligations? What do we have
to do to satisfy our responsibilities to our shareholders? You cannot legislate moral-
ity. We can start by implementing a rule requiring a hard 4:00 p.m. close for ac-
cepting orders. That is something concrete. That is a rule, and everybody
understands it. The increase of potential liability, the increase in lawsuits, the in-
crease in enforcement actions has created a need for rules. You cannot just have
fuzzy feelings saying you have to do the right thing.
MARGARET BANCROFT: Do you think the newest SEC-adopted rule, which is go-
ing to require seventy-five percent of the board to be independent together with an
independent chairman, is a going to do anything? I certainly have views about it,
but that strikes me as something that was picked up from a twenty-year debate in
corporate America using these exact sorts of panaceas, and I question whether that
is an answer.
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RICHARD PHILLIPS: The fund governance reforms the SEC adopted, such as the
requirement for an independent chair, are largely irrelevant to the issue. Indepen-
dent directors are not the cause of the market-timing problem. In only one case has
it been suggested, but never proved, that the independent directors knew about the
market timing. The independent directors are very important to the control of
conflicts that are inherent in this industry, and they have gotten important new
tools to do their job.
Those tools do not emanate from the fund governance reform rules as much as
they do from the Sarbanes-Oxley29-type reforms, including the new compliance
rule, which was proposed long before Spitzer entered the scene with his Canary
Partners' complaint against the fund industry. It was proposed during the Harvey
L. Pitt administration. The compliance rule, the Sarbanes-Oxley counsel reporting
rule, the new relationship between the auditors and an independent audit commit-
tee (including the requirement that the auditors be hired by and report to the audit
committee), and the whistleblower provision of Sarbanes-Oxley-all of this regula-
tion establishes the underpinnings for a culture of transparency. This culture has to
exist between the management and the independent directors if the independent
directors are going to do their jobs and infuse some sensitivity into the impersonal
relationship between the managers and the shareholders. I view these steps as posi-
tive, but they have very little to do with market timing.
TAMAR FRANKEL: I would like to add one more point. There is one principle that
will cover a lot, including the expertise about business. There is my business, and
there is the investor's business. So long as I'm an expert in the investment business,
I will be delighted, but when you become an expert in your business as a profes-
sional, then there is a problem. In addition, enforcement cannot be achieved by the
SEC alone, because the industry is so large and because the SEC does not have the
necessary resources. Advisers must operate internal controls; otherwise, the law will
not be obeyed. Advisers must exercise morality, that is, self-limitation; otherwise,
the law will not be obeyed. I think for many years this industry had the morality
and the self-limitation. Advisers had a gut reaction about wrongful behavior, but
moved away, because they began to view their activities as businesses. I suggest you
go back-
RICHARD PHILLIPS: I don't think you can go back; I think you have to accommo-
date-
TAMAR FRANKEL: Go forward.
RICHARD PHILLIPS: People are saying the same thing about the legal profession:
It used to be a profession and now it is a business.
TAMAR FRANKEL: That is correct.
29. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered sections of 11,
15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.).
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RICHARD PHILLIPS: The fact of the matter is that in the world of globalization
you need very large law firms, very large organizations, to serve the needs of society
in the legal sphere. Those large organizations have to be run by people who under-
stand that it is a business, because there are many families dependent upon, and
many dollars flowing through, those organizations. It is not something a profes-
sional can run unless that person is also a businessman. Let's accommodate the
change instead of wringing our hands and saying, "Oh, the world is changing and
we're losing our sense of professionalism." We have to accommodate it, and the
regulatory system has to accommodate it, too.
LISA FAIRFAX: We started off with the discussion of the Martin Act. What is your
idea about where to go with reform? Repeal the Martin Act?
FRANK RAZZANO: No, I would not repeal the Martin Act. What I do not like
about this scandal and the government's reaction to it, however, is best encapsu-
lated by what former SEC Commissioner Roberta Karmel said many years ago:
Regulation by investigation is wrong! If there is a problem, the government ought
to fix the problem with appropriate regulations. But what we are doing today with
respect to every single problem that we have is trotting out civil and, worse still,
criminal enforcement mechanisms to go after the problem. We are trying to change
the system through investigations and through civil and criminal prosecutions. I do
not think it is healthy for us as a society to do it in that fashion.
If there is a problem, let's fix the problem with new regulatory schemes that are
specific. If we want to have a hard 4:00 p.m. close, let's have a regulation that
requires a hard 4:00 p.m. close. To go after people and destroy their lives because
the SEC had a rule that was ambiguous about late trading, however, is wrong! As
you know, even law firms like Piper Marbury did not think that the NAV [net asset
value] was supposed to be exactly at 4:00 p.m. They are being sued for that now,
but there is no suggestion they were corrupt in reaching their opinion or interpret-
ing the old rule. I do not think that to go after people in this manner and destroy
their lives is right.
JAY BARIS: I would just add that the environment is becoming poisoned. I am
aware of a real-life case that is almost into the absurd. In this particular situation, a
simple examination by the SEC found what everybody, even the SEC in the exit
interview, considered to be a minor transgression; it was debatable whether it was
even a transgression of any law. The SEC issued a deficiency letter that accused the
trustees of a breach of fiduciary duty. This is an irresponsible use of a very power-
ful weapon. On a scale of one to a hundred, where market timing is a ninety, this
was about a two, if it were that. So, you have regulators coming out with guns
blazing. Who wants to be a director? Who is going to want to be in this business if
you cannot exercise your business judgment and face an allegation of a breach of
fiduciary duty, which in our world is a horrible and serious allegation?
RICHARD PHILLIPS: I have not found any less of a flow of applications from
people who want to be investment-company directors. There are a lot of people
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around who want to be investment-company directors. If you need a director, give
me a call and I will give you about five names. The fact of the matter is, I do not
think the scandal is impeding the ability of the industry to get directors. I think
that it is requiring a much greater time commitment on the part of directors, and
one has to take it more seriously. Some people are declining because they realize
they cannot make the commitment. But there are plenty of people out there who
like the idea of being directors, for good or bad reasons. And there are lots of good
independent directors who are trying to figure out how they can most effectively
exercise their oversight responsibilities.
JAY BARIs: They have all transferred their assets to their spouses.
MARGARET BANCROFT: It doesn't work. [laughter]
RICHARD PHILLIPS: If you are saying they are being prudent, that's OK.
MARGARET BANCROFT: I think just counting on mere numbers of directors and
an independent chair is not going to do it. I think that the directors of funds have
to have an understanding of the fund business that is at least as good as corporate
directors have of corporate business. When you think about how corporate direc-
tors are picked, they have been picked to the extent that the management can still
do it based on the expertise they can bring to the table. In many, many situations
those corporate board members do understand business in general and may under-
stand the particular business. Management looks on them as very serious peers. I
think that has a very powerful effect in boardrooms where the members of the
board are considered to be peers in the operation of the industry.
Fund directors, I would suggest to you, without an understanding of the distri-
bution system, even if they asked questions, were probably not in a position to
really know what fund advisers were doing in terms of distribution. Suppose man-
agement came in and told the board the following: "Look, we have an opportunity
with Canary to permit the market timing of a couple of our funds. That's going to
give us more assets in another fund, and it's generally going to be helpful to the
fund complex. We vetted it with legal, and legal says our prospectuses are written in
such a way that we could do this. We also went to the portfolio managers in ques-
tion, whose funds were to be timed, and they told us they could handle market
timing."
I am not sure that an independent director would have understood what was
wrong with this picture. He may not have appreciated the real mechanics of the
market timing, although the performance of the fund as such might not have been
affected. What was really going on with market timers was allocating to a short-
term player long-term gains. If you had understood that, you might have had an
effective director who would have said, "Stop, let me think about this and under-
stand it." I do think that one of the issues for independent directors, particularly
going forward, is coming to understand the industry a great deal better. Certainly
aspects of that are being undertaken, but it is important; it cannot just be a person
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of high moral integrity and quality. I think it really requires an ability to take on
the things that you hear in the boardroom and be heard.
MALE SPEAKER: I would part company with you here. I do not think it requires
someone to have expertise in the investment business or in the mutual fund busi-
ness. I think it requires someone to have the interest in learning about it and the
capacity to learn about it and the willingness to spend the time. Most of all, they
must realize that they are not on the board to be cheerleaders for the development
of the manager's business. Rather, they are on the board to keep an eye on the
interests of shareholders, particularly where the interests of the managers and
shareholders may diverge.
MALE SPEAKER: There has also been a sea change in the way directors are selected
in the last few years.
MARGARET BANCROFT: That is true.
MALE SPEAKER: The boards themselves are much more involved in who is being
selected, and there has been a sea change in the amount of education for indepen-
dent directors. The Independent Directors Conference of the ICI [Investment
Company Institute] had a conference the other day. These things are sold out;
people come, and directors are mostly interested in their duties and responsibilities
much more so than they were, say, twenty years ago. Their consciousness has been
greatly raised by all this. I do not know of any instances where people went to
boards, as you described it, and got them to approve market timing. I think this
was largely done-
MALE SPEAKER: There was an instance in which that was alleged, and that was in
the Bank of America case."
MARGARET BANCROFT: Yes, and that is why I asked whether the independent
director would have perceived the real problem. The other thing that should
change, and the SEC staff said this in 1992, is the agenda of the board books. The
agenda is a thicket of the annual review of this, the quarterly review of that, on and
on and on. It deflects the board with pages of data. Is everybody at fault here? Yes,
because fund advisers could, nevertheless, have sent routine board materials in ad-
vance of board meetings in order to leave time to open up the meetings to live
discussions of live topics. To see the agendas, they read like a liturgy. I think part of
what must be redesigned is what is discussed at meetings.
MALE SPEAKER: A large part of the mutual refund reform effort has nothing to
do with market timing, but like all kinds of scandals, they generate a broad-based
regulatory reform effort. A focus of that effort has been in the distribution area.
The panelists think that what the SEC is doing is going to be significant and impor-
tant in dealing with basically the distribution compensation, revenue sharing, bro-
kerage for sales, 12h-l,3' whatever.
30. In re Mut. Funds Inv. Litig., 384 F. Supp. 2d 845 (D. Md. 2005).
31. 17 C.F.R. § 240.12h-1 (2005).
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JAY BARIS: Whether you take the compensation out of the fund and separate it,
bifurcate it, and put it to point of sale may have all kinds of tax implications.
RICHARD PHILLIPS: The tax implications are very small when you look at the
dollars. I have done some back-of-the-envelope calculations, and it is a very small
disadvantage. What we are talking about is a suggestion that 12b-13 2 is now a fee for
distribution that is paid by the fund, or, more accurately, a class of shares of the
fund. That has given rise to all kinds of charges that they are unjustified, and re-
present hidden subsidies by the fund that the shareholders do not understand, etc.
In fact, it is, although 12b-1 wasn't designed to be so used-a substitute for the
front-end sales load, where the investor pays on a deferred basis the distribution
costs for use of an intermediary because they choose to. It is, in effect, a credit
arrangement-a deferred way of paying for the sales charge.
It has been suggested that in order to get transparency, you have to move that
charge (not abolish it, just move it) from the fund level to the shareholder account
level. The effect is that each time there is a deduction from the account, the share-
holder will understand that $28.56 was deducted this quarter from his or her ac-
count, just like they understand that when they are paying a front-end load, 5.75%
of their investment goes for sales charge. I am strongly of the view that this should
be done. This kind of transparency will, first, educate the investor as to what they
are paying for and, second, eliminate what in my view is the greatest source of
unjustified criticism and misunderstanding of the industry that I have ever seen.
Very smart people cannot get it into their heads that 12b-1 fees are simply deferred
sales charges-a sales charge, paid at the option of the investor on a deferred basis
because the investor chooses to use an intermediary and chooses to pay for it that
way. So let's take the charge out of the fund and charge it to the individual account.
Call a spade a spade, disclose it in dollars and cents, and get rid of the issues.
MALE SPEAKER: Dick, a lot of investors are finding that out because the sales of
Class B shares have gone way, way down and are certainly not what they were ten
years ago.
RICHARD PHILLIPS: That is because of the publicity, but when that dies down-
TAMAR FRANKEL: What about the fund that is closed to investors, where the
investors continue to pay that distribution?
RICHARD PHILLIPS: Tamar is as knowledgeable a person as you can find in the
industry, and yet she is raising something that is a total nonissue. What the 12b-l
fee pays for is the salesman's services at the point of sale on a deferred basis.
Whether the fund is closed today is irrelevant; it was open when the services were
performed and when the costs were incurred. All that the fund is doing is paying
out the deferred charge for those services.
TAMAR FRANKEL: Dick, for how long? For the next 10 years?
32. Id.
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RICHARD PHILLIPS: If we had better disclosure you would be able to regulate
that-
MALE SPEAKER: And, to be fair, part of that 12b-1 fee could be allocated to the
ongoing servicing and is not for sales compensation at all.
RICHARD PHILLIPS: That ought to be looked at. If it is servicing and that servic-
ing takes place, it takes place irrespective of whether the fund is closed, because the
investor's account is not closed. That is, if it does take place, and I have a question
about whether it really takes place.
JAY BARIS: Perhaps a more troublesome issue is what the SEC will do to regulate
the so-called revenue sharing, which is not as transparent. There was a proposal in
Congress that would ban all revenue sharing. How do you prevent somebody from
taking their profits and spending them any way they deem possible?
MARGARET BANCROFT: If you think they want to.
MALE SPEAKER: If they want to.
MARGARET BANCROFT: I do not think they want to. I think that the distributors
there have had the upper hand, and if you want your shares sold, you will partici-
pate in revenue sharing.
MALE SPEAKER: All you are saying to someone is, "You can use your profits any
way you want, but you cannot use it for an illegal activity." It is illegal to pay a
broker an under-the-table sum of money to encourage it to sell your shares; that is
all. It is very easy to legislate.
MALE SPEAKER: So, you are saying disclosure would cure that?
RICHARD PHILLIPS: I do not think disclosure does cure it, because I do not think
the investor really gets it and can get it. Say there is a broker who is receiving a sales
load for a transaction, in addition to receiving some brokerage from the fund he
sold, and in addition he is receiving revenue-sharing payments from the distributor
(all of which, when reduced to disclosure, is very complex) when the investor, who
is dealing usually through a broker, looks at alternatives, he sees the same disclo-
sure and the same payments.
MALE SPEAKER: But wait a minute. What about the new SEC proposal to re-
quire-
RICHARD PHILLIPS: That proposal makes the best case for the ineffectiveness of
disclosure. Look how complex it is, and that is only one piece of the compensation.
MALE SPEAKER: The proposal is only 500 pages.
RICHARD PHILLIPS: Yes, that's right; that makes my case. Thanks for helping.
QUESTION: One thing that nobody has said anything about is the effect of mis-
pricing of funds on the potential to profit from market timing.
RICHARD PHILLIPS: There are those who believe it is not feasible to take all of the
mispricing out of funds, and I am not sure they are right. There are funds that use
fair value pricing every day, and there are others who feel with equal justification
that daily fair valuation would lead to unreliable pricing because the methodologies
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for fair value pricing are not that accurate. We have to realize that, just as with
financial statements, fund pricing is not a "bureau of standards" exercise in
precision.
MALE SPEAKER: It is kind of a battle of the computers, too.
MALE SPEAKER: Market timing had evolved when the hedge funds started com-
ing in with these millions of dollars, where the funds were suffering, and you had
the portfolio managers coming to management saying, "You're killing my perform-
ance with the international funds and some of the thinly traded funds." That was
an evil right there. One thing I noticed yesterday in the Freemont settlement is that
there was no allegation, at least in the SEC's press release, that these funds them-
selves suffered any losses.
MALE SPEAKER: It is a real problem. We just got a call in real life: A client called
up on Wednesday afternoon. An event that had taken place in the United States on
Tuesday that affected the markets overseas. The Japanese futures in the United
States were going through the roof, but the market in Japan had not yet opened.
The issue was what to do. We know that anybody who buys into this fund is going
to be getting the price of the last close of the Japanese securities market. We also
know that is going to be lower than what those prices would be if the market were
open now and what they would be when the market does open in a couple of
hours. What do you do?
MARGARET BANCROFT: What I think is interesting, from reading the FSA report,
is this: One would have thought the market-timing arbs [arbitrageurs] were an
international crowd. They talk to each other. They know the theories. They have
read the same papers on the viability of market timing, which are on the Internet.
They understand exactly where the profits are to be made. It is interesting to me
that, apparently, market timing simply is not being played out in the European
fund marketplace. From what I can read in the FSA executive summary, to the
extent that the arbs have said to European funds, "Let me market-time," they have
been told, "You can't."
MALE SPEAKER: So we should make arbitrage illegal?
FEMALE SPEAKER: Oh, we know it's good. [laughter]
QUESTION: I would like to hear reactions to the continuous pricing notion. In
some sense, what we are going through now we have gone through several times
before. Jay, you mentioned that the technology has changed, but this sort of arbi-
trage was common in the 1920s. We had this debate in the '30s, and it led to a
pricing rule, which we had for twenty-eight years and then we switched. You could
think once-a-day pricing could be either forward looking or backward looking-
just sort of an arbitrary decision you make to do it once a day. Why is it that we
continue to hold to this antiquated notion of once-a-day pricing, and why is there
so much resistance to pricing funds continuously, which would eliminate this sort
of problem and maybe encourage arbitragers? Arbitragers are making money only
to the extent they are moving prices to where they should be.
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JAY BARIs: There is a movement, and they are called exchange-traded funds. Up
until now the SEC has said that you can only have this moment-to-moment pricing
with a fixed portfolio of securities so that everybody knows what is in them. You
have a basket of S&P 500 securities. Everybody knows what is in them. The issue is
whether we will move to an exchange trade of fund that will have a bucket of
securities that can be traded where the public does not know what is inside. There
is a bit of a disconnect there, but this is being considered. There is a movement in
this direction, so you might see a bucket of securities traded on daily and then
priced by the market.
MALE SPEAKER: I guess you have a cost factor there. It is worth mentioning that
all of these new regulatory regimes that are being put in are going to be very costly.
The cost for funds and fund managers has gone way, way up. Look at the insurance
and these constant SEC examinations.
MALE SPEAKER: Not to mention legal fees.
MALE SPEAKER: I think there is a large cost to it. I think it is technologically
possible, but expensive. Also, I am not sure it takes care of the problems. If you
were buying a fund at 1:00 p.m. and securities that are priced at the close of the
Tokyo market or securities that have been priced, because the last trade on the New
York took place at 10:00 a.m., you still have the fair value. I am not sure continuous
pricing is the answer to the problem. Continuous fair valuing might be, but you are
getting into a world of estimation.
Interestingly, the SEC historically resisted fair-value pricing even for interna-
tional funds because the Commission thought it was subjective. I think they now
realize that the dilution that takes place when you do not do it is such that you have
to accept the subjectivity. If you are fair value pricing continuously, that is difficult.
After all, you are pricing, say, Japanese securities based on baskets of ADRs [Ameri-
can Depository Receipts] and the futures market-some intricate methodologies.
People have different methodologies, different prices, and different judgments. I
think that is where we are moving, but I wonder whether it is really worth it to do
continuous pricing.
Jay Baris: Going forward, it is going to be very difficult for smaller fund groups
to survive, and there are going to be downward pressures on advisory fees, which I
assume will come up later today. I think one of the real sleeper provisions is the
one that requires the funds to disclose the directed deliberations and their conclu-
sions on advisory fees. I think this will provide downward pressures on advisory
fees, and it is going to be something that both the SEC and the private bar can
shoot at and second-guess.
FEMALE SPEAKER: I think that is right. It certainly makes the directors more self-
conscious as to what they are doing. We have seen the effect already.
MALE SPEAKER: And Spitzer is already requiring fee reductions as part of his
settlement.
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MALE SPEAKER: But that is part of Spitzer's genius. He knows how difficult it is
to figure out what the damage is from market timing. Instead of doing the nasty
haggling as to whether it is "X" cents of shares or "X" cents of shares, he goes after
management fees and gets big dollars and big headlines. I have enormous respect
for him as a high-flying regulator.
MALE SPEAKER: We're going to send him to California, Dick. [laughter]
RICHARD PHILLIPS: His genius, as Frank points out, is his ability to bring crimi-
nal-
MALE SPEAKER: No, I really think it is his activity. The Martin Act has been
there, and it has been there, and it has been there, and he really has humongous
energy.
MALE SPEAKER: He has enormous energy, enormous cleverness, and understand-
ing that financial institutions cannot stand publicity. And he has no scruples about
using the press to accomplish his aims. He is very effective.
MALE SPEAKER: Well, he is going to get his because his opponent for governor is
going to be Chuck Schumer, who has all that in spades, plus a lot more money.
MALE SPEAKER: Yes, I think he may want to stay on as attorney general for a
while. [laughter]
LISA FAIRFAX: Does anyone else have a question? OK, I thank the panel for their
quite lively discussion and participation. I'm sure if you have a question you want
to ask anyone independently, you can feel free to do so. Thank you.
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